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Introduction
Our Position Is Clear
We live—we are told by politicians, the media, and even scholars—in an 
unprecedented age of terror. To cite just one example of such rhetoric, the 
contentious conservative Australian senator Pauline Hanson warned in 2016 
that “we have terrorism on the streets that we’ve never had before.” 1 Of course, 
such claims are patently and indeed often willfully ahistorical. Our present-
day age of terror is far from being the first, or even the most formative, epoch 
of terrorism of the past two centuries. Since the birth of modern terrorism 
in the mid-nineteenth century, political violence and terrorism have been a 
continuous presence in the global political landscape, from the anarchists 
and nationalists of the pre–World War I era, to the state-sponsored terror of 
the interwar period, to the anticolonial struggles following World War II, 
on to the militant leftists of the Cold War, and finally to the terrorism of the 
present day.
Even among those who concede that the contemporary age of terror is 
not sui generis, many still contend that today’s political violence differs fun-
damentally from that of previous eras. The issue centers on the fundamental 
question of who today’s terrorists are. Prior to September 11, 2001, according 
to this thinking, terrorism was primarily a domestic problem perpetrated by 
domestic actors. That is, through the end of the twentieth century, the history 
of terrorism was essentially national in character, the contributions of various 
international and transnational forces notwithstanding. 2 With 9/11, however, 
terrorism moved beyond national borders. Shifts in the political constellations 
of the post–Cold War world and a radical transformation in the nature of glo-
balization, the reasoning goes, led to a new kind of terrorism that emanated 
primarily from those considered in one way or another as outsiders, meaning 
migrants, foreigners, and diaspora communities.
But here again history tells a different story. As one of many examples—
not coincidentally the subject of this book—emigrant Croatian separatists 
who sought the destruction of socialist Yugoslavia and the establishment of 
an independent Croatian state were among the most dynamic terrorists of 
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the second half of the twentieth century. Active in countries as widely dis-
persed as Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, West Germany, and the United 
States, Croatian extremists were responsible for scores of bombings around 
the world in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as numerous attempted and success-
ful assassinations. Croatian separatists also launched two guerilla incursions 
into socialist Yugoslavia and carried out the hijacking of two airplanes. In 
Australia alone, state security officials attributed at least sixty-five incidents 
of significant violence to Croatian separatists between 1963 and 1972, no less 
than twenty of which they characterized as “major.” 3 Worldwide, anti-Yugo-
slav Croats committed on average one act of terror every five weeks between 
1962 and 1980.
If today somewhat forgotten, violence perpetrated in the struggle for 
Croatian national independence was far from inconsequential. To give one 
example of the seriousness with which Croatian revolutionary separatism was 
viewed, in 1972 the West German government declared political violence 
among migrant Croats to be the country’s “number one problem with for-
eigners.” 4 Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United 
States classified Croats together with the Puerto Rican Armed Forces of 
National Liberation (FALN; Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional) and 
the Cuban Omega 7 as the most dangerous foreign national terrorists operating 
in the country. 5 And in socialist Yugoslavia itself, President Josip Broz Tito 
characterized ongoing Croatian terrorism as perhaps the greatest “threat to 
the [Yugoslav] regime and to the survival of the federal state.” 6 To be sure, 
terrorism did not lead to either the breakup of socialist Yugoslavia or the es-
tablishment of the Republic of Croatia. But it did help define the discursive, 
rhetorical, and political parameters that framed the path to both.
As to the supposed novelty of the role played by transnational and inter-
national actors in contemporary terrorism and political violence, the basic 
contours of this argumentation can be seen globally in recent developments 
in state policies dealing with terrorism as well as in the polemical rhetoric 
of those who seek to instrumentalize both the real and imagined threat of 
“foreigner violence” to promote various political agendas. As the scholar of 
international relations Fiona Adamson observes: “International migration has 
moved to the top of the international security agenda. Increasingly, policy-
makers in the United States, Europe, and around the world are making links 
between migration policy and national security. Much of this discussion has 
focused on migration flows as a conduit of international terrorism.” 7 In other 
words, the first step in combatting terrorism has shifted from identifying and 
then addressing the myriad root causes of radicalization to controlling and 
securitizing transnational migration. 8 If we stop migration—to distill this idea 
even further—we stop terrorism.
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Such policies have been accompanied by a sharp increase in politicized 
rhetoric on the perceived connection between terrorism and migration, pri-
marily among increasingly emboldened right-wing populists the world over. 
In January 2018, to provide just one example, US president Donald Trump 
tweeted his claim that “nearly 3 in 4 individuals convicted of terrorism-related 
charges are foreign-born,” citing a report produced jointly by the United States 
Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ). 9 Significantly, 
neither the tweet nor the report upon which it was based made mention of the 
fact that the alarming statistic included only those found guilty of “interna-
tional” terrorism and excluded all cases of people convicted of “domestic” 
terrorism. The political motives for the Trump administration’s flagrant mis-
representation of the character of terrorists and terrorism in the current debate 
over immigration are transparent. Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán, 
meanwhile, has been even more brazen in making claims about the direct 
relationship between migration and terrorism. To cite just two examples of 
his rhetoric, “migration is the Trojan wooden horse of terrorism” 10 and “the 
factual point is that all the terrorists are basically migrants.” 11
As recent scholarship has demonstrated, however, very few facts sup-
port either such state policies or rhetorical claims. Studies examining the 
relationship between migration and political violence have repeatedly found 
no causal link between the two issues. 12 Indeed, the most current research 
strongly suggests that, if anything, the opposite may be true. As one of the 
first large-scale quantitative studies of the relationship between migration and 
terrorism concludes: “Our arguments and empirical analyses support the . . . 
hypothesis that immigrants are an important vehicle for the diffusion of terror-
ism from one country to another. At the same time, . . . our results emphasize 
that immigration per se is unlikely to positively affect terrorism. On the con-
trary, we actually find that more migration generally (i.e., when immigration 
is not necessarily linked to terrorism in the migrants’ countries of origin) into 
a country is associated with a lower level of terrorist attacks.” 13 Rather than 
asserting that there is no relationship between population flows and political 
violence, this study stresses—in direct contradiction to claims made by politi-
cal figures such as Hanson, Trump, and Orbán—that the relationship between 
migration and terrorism is neither intrinsic nor linear. Migration certainly can 
and indeed has contributed to increased terrorist activity around the world. 
But it has also served at times as an important factor in processes of deradi-
calization and peace-building, both in migrants’ homelands and in their host 
countries. 14 And in still other situations, there has been no correlation—causal 
or otherwise—between migration and political violence. The point is simply, 
to quote the noted scholar of terrorism Alex P. Schmid, that “the relationship 
between terrorism and various forms of migration is a complex one.” 15
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Difficulty in unraveling the manifold layers of complexity that exist 
in the linkages between population flows and political violence is at least 
in part a product of disciplinary segregation that exists within academia. 
Without making too fine a point about it, only recently have scholars of 
migration—whose cutting-edge research comes from the field of social 
anthropology—shown interest in the work of scholars examining political 
violence and terrorism, topics that in recent years have been primarily the 
domain of political scientists and political sociologists. As Schmid explains, 
for much of their respective histories, “the study of terrorism and the study 
of migration have been two separate fields. While there is a huge literature 
on both migration and on terrorism, there are no in-depth studies on the 
intersection of the two phenomena.” 16 In many ways, this state of affairs 
is itself quite revealing, indicating that the relationship between migration 
and terrorism is perhaps far less essential or compelling than contemporary 
political figures would have us believe. The flip side, of course, is that the 
scarcity of academic literature directly exploring the connection between 
population flows and political violence has left open considerable discursive 
space for claims of a causal link between increases in migration and terror 
that are based on perception, anecdote, and political agenda rather than on 
considered and rigorous research.
One of the more intriguing possible bridges linking migration and ter-
rorism research is an academic discipline that has, broadly speaking, both 
neglected and been neglected by each—namely, history. Again, echoing the 
previous point, it is not that there are no histories of either migration or 
terrorism. Indeed, both migration and terrorism scholarship often draw on 
historical examples to support their conceptual and theoretical claims. But 
even if we accept evidence that the humanities and social sciences are moving 
toward greater multi- and interdisciplinarity, deep-seated and long-standing 
disciplinary partitions have often led scholars to engage neighboring disci-
plines in only the most cursory and superficial ways, leaving disregarded 
perspectives and approaches that could constructively inform their own 
work. What sets history apart in this constellation is its nature as a truly 
hybrid discipline, straddling the humanities and social sciences in ways that 
other disciplines do not. 17 Even if history has a tendency to discover only 
belatedly theoretical and conceptual developments in other fields, once it 
does, to quote Isabelle Duyvesteyn, it is singularly equipped to turn “the grey 
areas between disciplines that used to be dividing walls [into] promising new 
areas of research.” 18 While history alone can never fully solve the problem of 
understanding, the core tools of the discipline—chronology, narrative, and 
interpretation—all serve as ready pathways to understanding in numerous 
and varied disciplines. 19
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To state the point differently, scholars researching both migration and 
terrorism could learn something from history. Or rather—to be even more 
precise—they could both learn something from historiography. This serves 
as the fundamental starting point of this book. While the empirical subject to 
be explored in the text—Cold War–era anti-Yugoslav separatist Croats—may 
be of greatest interest to specialists in Croatian and Yugoslav history, the un-
derlying conceptual issues addressed in the book—the origins, development, 
and character of diasporic political violence—are relatable across disciplines 
and specialties. The text makes no claims to proposing an overarching model 
for understanding the relationship between migration and terrorism. It does, 
however, seek to provide new and formative perspectives for those aiming for 
this goal. To borrow from the historian and noted scholar of political violence 
and terrorism Walter Laqueur, this book, like all histories of terrorism, is by no 
means “a magic wand, a key to all the mysteries of contemporary terrorism.” 
Still, as he continues in his own study of the phenomenon, “in the absence of 
other satisfactory explanations, it [does] provide some useful insights” that can 
contribute to the growing—and necessary—debates both within and outside 
academia about one of the more prominent and pressing issues of the day. 20
Overview
The central aim of this book is less to recount each individual act of political 
violence at the hands of Croatian separatists than to explore the social and po-
litical factors that led at least some members of the emigrant Croat population 
to embrace terrorism as an acceptable form of political expression during the 
Cold War. In other words, its concern is with the discourses and practices of 
radicalization and the ways in which both individuals and groups engaging 
in terrorism construct a particular image of the world to justify their actions. 
Most importantly, it was not simply the extreme nationalism of Croatian sep-
aratists that engendered radicalization. Rather, it was an engagement with 
particular transnational structures and practices that encouraged certain po-
litical actors first to imagine, then develop, and finally justify the decision to 
incorporate violence into their repertoires of political engagement. In this re-
gard—to borrow from the sociologist Arjun Appadurai—landscapes became 
as important as lands in envisioning, organizing, and realizing violence in the 
name of national liberation. 21
While myriad factors contributed to the radicalization of anti-Yugoslav 
Croats during the Cold War, four stand out as most formative. The first and 
arguably most important factor in engendering extremist Croatian separat-
ism were patterns of migration. Political violence and terrorism that aimed 
to destroy socialist Yugoslavia and establish an independent Croatia was in 
character and practice a diasporic phenomenon. Importantly, “diaspora” is not 
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understood here as a “bona fide actual entit[y],” as Gabriel Sheffer writes in his 
influential work on the subject. 22 Rather, this book employs the understanding 
of diaspora as articulated by Rogers Brubaker—namely, “stances, projects, 
claims, idioms, practices, and so on.” 23 Diasporas, in other words, are not 
bounded communities that can be described in essentialist terms. Instead, they 
are the collection of experiences, formulations, and contentions made in the 
name of said alleged bounded communities. Rather than being characterized 
by homogeneity and unity, diasporas are always marked by diversity and even 
discord, resulting in their being—in James Clifford’s deft formulation—“a 
‘changing same,’ something endlessly hybridized and in process.” 24
This idea of a “changing same” is central to understanding the process of 
radicalization among those who came to embrace extremism and militancy 
in the name of Croatian freedom. Cold War–era diasporic Croatian politics 
was defined by its fierce infighting and fractional splintering. Among the first 
generation of emigrants who fled to the West in the immediate aftermath of 
World War II, this fragmentation actually resulted in something of a deradi-
calization of the national liberation movement. To be sure, the rhetoric of this 
first postwar generation of anti-Yugoslav Croats—the majority of whom had 
been members of the fascist Ustaša movement during the war—contained 
plentiful calls to political violence during the early years of the Cold War. 25 
But actual—as opposed to rhetorical—violence was absent from their activ-
ities. The reversion to political violence and terrorism came only with a shift 
in the demographic makeup of the Croatian community abroad beginning in 
the late 1950s that fundamentally changed the dynamics of Croatian diasporic 
stances and practice.
The standard narrative of the history of Cold War–era Croatian sepa-
ratism attributes the movement’s return to terrorism to younger emigrants 
being exposed to Ustašism by older, post–World War II émigrés. 26 Without 
minimizing the unquestionably formative role played by both the history and 
principles of the Ustaše in fostering Cold War–era Croatian political violence, 
however, this book argues that the violent radicalization of younger emigrants, 
in fact, developed as a result of direct opposition to the older generation. In 
the eyes of those who arrived in the West after the late 1950s, the generation 
of Ustaša émigrés that had fled Yugoslavia following the collapse of the war-
time Independent State of Croatia (NDH; Nezavisna Država Hrvatska) had 
accomplished very little since being forced from their homeland. Indeed, the 
older generation had brought about not just a general stagnation in émigré 
separatist politics but had diminished the possibility for revolutionary change 
in Croatia. 27 This fervent disillusionment with the older generation of Croatian 
emigrants, as will be explored extensively, became the cornerstone for the 
radicalization of younger separatists beginning in the 1960s.
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A second dynamic contributing to the radicalization of Croats in the em-
igration were shifts in the political landscape of international relations and 
politics throughout the Cold War years that influenced both the ideological 
and organizational development of Croatian separatism and helped define the 
strategic thinking of radical separatists. For much of the 1950s, the Croatian 
political emigration bet heavily on what they—together with many others—
believed would be the inevitable military confrontation between East and 
West. In this conflict, according to the logic of anti-Yugoslav separatists in 
the first fifteen years following the end of World War II, Croats both in the 
emigration and within Tito’s Yugoslavia would side with the West against 
the forces of the East, fighting together with the Western Powers to liberate 
eastern Europe from the forces of communism. For their efforts, the Croatian 
nation would be rewarded with an independent state sponsored by and allied 
with the West.
In what would prove a fateful concurrence of events, the demographic 
shift in the Croatian emigration came just as détente among the Great Powers 
was starting to define Cold War international politics. Of the issues fueling 
the conflict between the younger and older generations of Croatian separat-
ists in the emigration, few were as contentious as the question regarding the 
degree to which the national liberation movement should rely on the West for 
either moral or material support. In direct opposition to postwar émigrés, the 
younger generation believed the question of Croatian statehood to be irrelevant 
to the Great Powers and, as such, would never factor into the strategic consid-
erations of global politics. To wait on the Western—or indeed any—Powers 
to come to the nation’s rescue was, simply, to wait on a train that would never 
come. Instead, the only way forward was for the people of the nation itself to 
take up arms and bring down Tito’s hated Yugoslav state through violent and 
revolutionary struggle.
This radicalization among Croatian separatists arose at least in part due 
to a third dynamic—namely, the context of the violence within which the 
postwar Croatian national liberation movement operated. Among the myriad 
violent milieus through which anti-Yugoslav Croatian separatism had to ma-
neuver during the Cold War, four can be identified as particularly formative 
in the radicalization of Croatian nationalists. The first was a deeply ingrained 
national victim complex that served as an integral component of postwar 
Croatian diasporic identity discourses. At the heart of this victim complex was 
the Bleiburg tragedy, when tens of thousands of Croats and others were killed 
by Yugoslav Partisan forces at the end of World War II. For many Croatian 
emigrants—and not just radicals—Bleiburg was proof positive of the Belgrade 
regime’s intent to carry out nothing less than the “biological destruction” of the 
Croatian nation. 28 In other words, “Serbo-communist” rule in Yugoslavia—to 
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use a favorite term of anti-Belgrade Croats—was not simply autocratic and 
discriminatory against Croats but was manifestly genocidal. As such, violent 
struggle against Belgrade was not only legitimate; it was absolutely necessary 
for the existential survival of the nation.
The second formative milieu of violence within which radical Croatian 
separatists operated was a particular interpretation of Croatia’s own recent 
history. As much as the younger generation of separatists resented and even 
vilified postwar émigrés, they praised the older generation for its activities 
during the interwar period. Indeed, a major point of contention between the 
two generations was the younger generation’s failure to understand why the 
older generation—in opposing socialist Yugoslavia—had ignored those strat-
egies of uncompromising struggle that had earlier succeeded against interwar 
royalist Yugoslavia. Younger emigrants asserted that it was the campaign of 
terror waged by Ante Pavelić’s Ustaša movement in the 1930s that had made 
possible the establishment of the NDH in 1941—Croatia’s first state in nearly 
a thousand years. The same would equally be true, younger radicals argued, 
for a new independent Croatia. Of course, this reading of history ignored many 
crucial details regarding the establishment of the NDH, not least the circum-
stances of World War II and the Axis invasion of the Balkans. But for postwar 
separatists, the particulars of how the NDH came to be were less important 
than finding in their own history a model for achieving national liberation.
A third milieu of violence was provided by global events in the early Cold 
War years that reinforced the idea that revolutionary political violence was 
an effective political strategy for achieving national independence. To what-
ever degree bipolar Great Power confrontation determined much of postwar 
international politics, the younger generation of Croatian separatists recog-
nized that the era was equally defined by revolutionary struggles for national 
liberation. With special focus on the revolutions in Cuba, Algeria, and the 
Congo, anti-Yugoslav Croats found in postwar anticolonialism a model for 
how to frame and wage their conflict with Belgrade. 29 These young radicals 
asserted that “Serbo-communism” was not just genocidal but imperialistic. 
Thus, socialist Yugoslavia’s incorporation of Croatia was no different than the 
United Kingdom’s occupation of India or Portugal’s control over Angola. The 
only way to break imperial rule, global history was showing, was to rise up 
against a nation’s colonial masters in armed struggle. If the peoples of Africa, 
Latin America, and Asia could achieve national independence this way, then 
certainly the Croats could as well.
Finally, the evolution of Croatian anti-Yugoslav separatist politics over 
the course of the 1960s and 1970s starkly reflects the era’s broader culture 
of terrorism. The decade following the coming of age of the so-called 1968 
generation witnessed a striking surge in the adoption of violence as a form of 
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political articulation. The early 1970s saw the blossoming of groups such as 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Red Army Faction (RAF; Rote 
Armee Fraktion), National Liberation Front (FLN; Front de libération natio-
nale), Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA; Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse), all of 
which actively embraced terrorism as a legitimate means for pursuing their 
political aims. Operationally and ideologically, Croatian separatists generally 
both isolated themselves from and were isolated by others throughout the Cold 
War era, in large part due to the real and imagined fascist overtones of both 
their rhetoric and aims. Nevertheless, Croatian separatists functioned within 
the increasingly radicalized global political environment of the time and were 
invariably influenced by the strategies, methods, and even principles of other 
violent groups. While the postwar activities of émigré Croatian separatists 
predated those of most other radical groups active around the same time, it is 
no coincidence that the frequency and seriousness of Croatian separatist vio-
lence greatly increased after 1968. Whereas Croatian terrorism primarily took 
the form of late-night bomb attacks and assassination attempts during much of 
the 1960s, by the end of the decade and into the 1970s, it added the plane hi-
jackings and hostage-taking used by other contemporaneous terrorist groups.
A fourth factor contributing to the radicalization of Croatian separat-
ists could be merged with the third but deserves separate consideration. 
Throughout the Cold War years, there was little that both affected and helped 
define the strategies of anti-Titoist extremists more than state-sponsored re-
actions to their activities. First and foremost, this meant the actions of the 
Yugoslav State Security Administration (Udba; Uprava državne bezbednosti), 
which aggressively engaged émigré Croatian separatists for the entirety of 
the country’s existence. 30 Much of the Udba’s engagement with what they 
variably referred to as “the hostile emigration” (neprijateljska emigracija), 
“the fascist emigration” ( fašistička emigracija), and “the extreme emigration” 
(ekstremna emigracija) involved acts of violence, with Yugoslav agents re-
sponsible for potentially dozens of assassinations of separatist Croats over the 
course of the Cold War. In addition, Udba agents infiltrated a great majority 
of émigré separatist organizations in Australia, West Germany, the United 
States, and elsewhere, using agents provocateurs to undermine their efforts. 
Importantly, the purpose of this infiltration was not the destruction of the 
separatist movement but rather, for reasons that will later be discussed, its 
further radicalization.
The behavior of the governments of the countries where Croatian sepa-
ratists lived and operated and also where the majority of Croatian separatist 
violence took place was similarly formative. Importantly, this included inac-
tion as an active undertaking. It would be specious to suggest that government 
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and security officials in places like Bonn, Stockholm, or Canberra either 
encouraged or even supported Croatian separatist violence against socialist 
Yugoslavia. It is, however, true that as a result of both irresoluteness and 
political calculation they often failed to actively pursue stringent policies to 
curtail that violence. For a full decade after the first significant act of postwar 
Croatian separatist terrorism took place—in West Germany in 1962—Western 
capitals viewed the movement ambivalently, which led them to adopt what best 
can be described as a laissez-faire attitude toward the activities of extremist 
Croats. This in turn provided separatist radicals with the necessary social 
and political space in which to organize and operate. Only beginning in the 
early 1970s did Western governments begin to change their stances toward 
Croatian extremism. Their adoption of new measures to constrain the move-
ment led to a rapid and ultimately effective deradicalization of the Croatian 
separatist movement.
These four factors are, of course, far from exhaustive. Equally important, 
it is crucial not to be overly deterministic as to the radicalizing effect these 
various social and structural dynamics had on both individuals and organi-
zations. As deadly as anti-Yugoslav Croatian political violence was during 
the Cold War, it remained the product of a small percentage of the hundreds 
of thousands of Croats living in the emigration. A West German govern-
mental report from 1972 put it succinctly: “The vast majority of Croats in 
the Federal Republic are docile. [The problem of terrorism is] a matter of 
only a tiny, virulent minority.” 31 Australian prime minister Gough Whitlam 
expressed a similar view in a letter written in 1973 at the height of a crisis 
involving Croatian terrorists: “Only a small minority of Croatian immigrants 
are engaged in acts of political terrorism in this country.” He continued, “The 
majority of Croatian and other Yugoslav settlers are highly valued citizens and 
residents of this country.” 32 In other words—in a lesson that politicians today 
would do well to heed—the problem was not with Croats as such. Rather, 
the problem of radicalization arose with a small group of people for reasons 
related to complex relationships among myriad and competing social move-
ments, practical and circumstantial limitations, and personal, political, and 
institutional disruption. This distinction is important.
This said, a critical mass of Croats in the emigration did radicalize, spark-
ing a twenty-year-long campaign of violence and terrorism that led to death and 
destruction around the globe. It is important to understand that the Croatian 
separatists’ embrace and execution of political violence and terrorism did not 
result from some dysfunctional irrationality, whether understood systemically, 
organizationally, or even psychologically. Rather, it was the product of an 
identifiable development in strategic thinking among anti-Yugoslav radicals 
that led to coherent—if unquestionably both myopic and distorted—choices 
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of action. While one can argue that decisions regarding the use of violence by 
adherents of the national liberation movement were misguided, imprudent, 
and even amoral, they were made by actors with a particular understanding 
of the world and their place in it, an understanding shaped by a multitude of 
factors and experiences.
This book traces the factors that contributed to the radicalization of the 
second generation of post–World War II Croatian emigrants to the West. 
The six chronologically arranged chapters conform to pivotal and formative 
developments in the history of Cold War-era radical Croatian separatism. 
The opening chapter examines fractures and fissures within the movement 
in the first postwar decade and their general influence on émigré political 
engagement. It demonstrates how and why terrorism, once a cornerstone of 
the Ustaše, ceased to be part of the functional political repertoire of radical 
émigré separatism. Chapter 2 explores how, during the second half of the 
1950s, the focus of émigré separatism shifted away from fighting the hated 
socialist Yugoslav state to a basic—and ruinous—internal power struggle. 
As a consequence of this change, active political agitation aimed at securing 
an independent Croatian state became, at best, only a secondary priority for 
radical organizations within the diaspora. Instead, by the late 1950s compe-
tition for new recruits came to dominate the activities of rival factions. As 
will be explored, these rivalries were a crucial factor in the radicalization of 
a younger generation of separatists in the 1960s, but often not in the manner 
imagined by the older generation.
Chapter 3 explores the general factors that led in the early 1960s—after 
nearly two decades of inactivity—to a renewal of extremist politics within 
the diaspora. First and foremost, the chapter focuses on the activity of a new 
generation of emigrants who left socialist Yugoslavia for the West beginning 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In particular, it looks at the political and stra-
tegic thinking of these new radical emigrants, including the role of ideology 
in the radicalization of many who joined the Croatian separatist movement. 
Chapter 4 then provides a more narrative exploration of the first acts of terror 
committed by radical Croatian separatists beginning in 1962. The chapter 
examines the development of the tactics used to draw attention to the Croatian 
cause globally during the 1960s and the ways in which purveyors of vio-
lence justified their actions. It also explores how émigré violence provoked 
state-sponsored violence, creating new landscapes of engagement among the 
various actors invested both positively and negatively in Croatian separatism.
Chapter 5 looks at the period that, in hindsight, proved to be the high point 
of the radical Croatian separatist movement. It delves into the many social, 
cultural, and political factors that, taken together, led emigrant separatists 
to adopt a number of critical changes in their tactical and strategic thinking, 
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which translated into a period of intense activity. During this period, Croatian 
separatists hijacked an airplane in Sweden, occupied a Yugoslav consulate, 
bombed scores of Yugoslav institutions around the world, assassinated several 
Yugoslav diplomats and representatives, and launched a spectacular if ill-fated 
armed guerilla incursion into the heart of socialist Yugoslavia. In the short 
term, the resultant wave of terror brought Croatian terrorists both fame and 
infamy. In the long term, this increased violence precipitated the imposition of 
new and ever more debilitating governmental restraints on separatist radicals. 
Chapter 6, in turn, deals with the repercussions of this greater attention paid 
to Croatian separatists by various state actors. The mid-1970s was witness to 
arguably the most brazen acts of Croatian separatist terrorism. At the same 
time, the period also saw the precipitous marginalization of the movement. 
Precisely at the time Croatian radicals became most adventurous, states took 
concerted action to end—definitively once and for all—not just anti-Yugoslav 
terrorism but terrorism of all kinds. Finally, the epilogue explores how, in the 
early 1980s, terrorism ceased to be a part of diasporic political engagement, 
replaced in its stead by other forms of activity.
Here, a word concerning the overall periodization of the book is in order. 
The title of the book—Croatian Radical Separatism and Diaspora Terrorism 
During the Cold War—refers to a well-understood period of time, from, say, 
the 1947 publication of George F. Kennan’s “X Article” 33 to the 1991 dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union. Anti-Yugoslav Croatian political violence, however, 
was limited, roughly speaking, to the years 1962 to 1980. The use of “Cold 
War” to frame the book is nonetheless appropriate for two reasons. First, since 
this book is equally as concerned with terrorism as such as with the processes 
of radicalization and deradicalization that led to the use and eventual aban-
donment of violence, the longer time frame is applicable. Second, “Cold War” 
serves as more than simply a marker of periodization. Rather, the Cold War 
is both context and milieu. In the case of radical Croatian separatism, it was a 
context and milieu that both made the movement possible and gave it shape.
Questions regarding the book’s periodization are most likely to be raised 
regarding the years immediately leading up to and following the end of the 
Cold War. Readers with an interest in Croatian or Yugoslav history may object 
that the text fails to explore the link between the radical separatism of the 
1960s and 1970s and the paramilitarism and Ustaša revivalism of the early 
1990s in Croatia. The explanation, simply, is that the Croatian radical separat-
ist movement had been marginalized and indeed suppressed nearly a decade 
before the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia. During the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, a new form of Croatian diasporic engagement with “homeland 
politics” developed that was separate—if, of course, still closely related—
from that of radical separatism in the preceding decades. To be sure, important 
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parallels, connections, and continuities can be drawn between the two. In 
fact, several authors have done just that, most notably Paul Hockenos, Zlatko 
Skrbiš, and Francesco Ragazzi. 34 However, the substantial and significant 
differences between earlier radical separatism and later diasporic homeland 
politics argues for seeing the two as more than simply successive phases of 
the same basic phenomenon.
The decision to relegate the history of the second half of the 1980s and 
the wars of the 1990s to this book’s epilogue stems from what admittedly 
might be an exaggerated desire to make a historiographic point. Terrorism 
was unquestionably both a product and a feature of Cold War–era Croatian 
diasporic politics. But it is imperative not to conflate the two. As mentioned 
earlier, those who engaged in acts of political violence represented only a 
tiny minority of those active in the broader struggle for Croatian indepen-
dence from socialist Yugoslavia and an even smaller percentage of the overall 
Croatian emigrant population. This book, to state the point directly, is a his-
tory of diasporic separatism that turned to terrorism in an attempt to advance 
the cause, not a general history of diasporic separatism during the Cold War. 
Croatian nationalism in the emigration in the late 1980s and early 1990s was 
often unquestionably radical, militant, and even violent. It did not, however, 
employ terrorism—or at least the rather narrowly understood form of terror-
ism explored in this text.
The distinction between violence and terrorism may be minor, but it is also 
vital. The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a revival of Ustaša symbols 
and ideology within Croatia. 35 To a great degree, this tradition—suppressed 
in socialist Yugoslavia—had been sustained in the emigration. This book ar-
gues that, perhaps against expectations, the radical separatist movement was 
not the most significant factor in keeping Ustašism alive. Rather, a number of 
strands within the political emigration nurtured and promoted the cult of the 
NDH and the Ustaše. Moreover, the revival of Ustašism in the waning days of 
socialist Yugoslavia owed less to those who had engaged in political violence 
and terrorism during the middle decades of the Cold War than to others in the 
diaspora who proved pivotal in the years that followed. For this reason, this 
book deals only peripherally as opposed to systematically with the diaspora’s 
role in Croatia’s political developments in the years immediately before and 
after the end of the Cold War.
Conceptual and Definitional Frames
The overall narrative and argument of this book relies on some central 
conceptual and definitional frames. It has become almost obligatory, for 
example, that academic texts dealing with political violence convey some 
version of the observation that scholars of terrorism are far more numerous 
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than terrorists, and that there are, in fact, more definitions of “terrorism” than 
scholars of the field. Perhaps nowhere has this problem been exposed more 
starkly than in the opening chapter of Alex P. Schmid, A. J. Jongman, and 
Michael Stohl’s seminal text Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, 
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature, which cites and 
discusses no less than 109 definitions for the term “terrorism.” 36 In con-
trast—although the term is employed throughout—this narrative study offers 
no authoritative definition of “terrorism.” As Isabelle Duyvesteyn has writ-
ten, while in the social sciences such definitions are “deemed essential to 
agree on the basic outline of what the subject entails,” in historical studies 
“this problem is important but less pressing.” 37 For the historian, in other 
words, precise definitions of the terms “terror,” “terrorism,” and “terrorist” 
are in many ways ancillary to conveying both the situational and—more 
important—normative uses of the labels.
In its use of the term “terrorism,” this book adopts the language that 
radical Croatian separatists themselves used to describe their activities. It 
was broadly understood among extremists in the emigration that national 
liberation from the clutches of “Serbo-communism” could only come through 
revolutionary struggle. In time, this revolution would take the form of a mass, 
popular uprising within the Socialist Republic of Croatia against the regime 
in Belgrade. Preceding the rising up of the Croatian nation, however, the 
struggle would by necessity take the form of sabotage, guerilla insurgency, 
and—importantly—terrorism in order to lay the foundations upon which to 
build the successful revolution. Some separatist groups called for their fol-
lowers to engage in acts of “commando-terrorism.”  38 Others were a bit more 
circumspect, describing their actions as the “inversion of standard warfare.” 39 
Still others simply ordered those in their ranks to “destroy all Yugo-embassies 
and consulates [and] kill Yugoslav diplomatic representatives”: acts of terror 
by any other name. 40
Most importantly—as radical separatists themselves recognized—the 
term used to label the violence perpetrated in service of the revolutionary 
struggle for national liberation was and in many ways remains arguably 
ultimately immaterial. This idea was captured bluntly but effectively in a 
manifesto released to justify the hijacking of an American airplane by radical 
Croats in 1976:
We expect all “peace-loving” forces in the world to describe us as ter-
rorists. . . . The point to be made here, obviously, is not to conclusively 
define “terrorism,” an impossible and unnecessary task. . . . One man’s 
terrorist is another man’s patriot, depending solely on one’s national and 
political objective and suitability.
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We must remember that today’s “terrorists” are often tomorrow’s pol-
icy makers, having participated in the formation of a new, independent 
state. Such was the position of the supporters of the Declaration of 
Independence. . . . With this reality reappearing dependably from one 
day to the next, all ethical and moral revulsion felt for so-called “terror-
ist” acts is necessarily irrational. 41
If hijacking an airplane—or assassinating a diplomat, bombing an embassy, 
or taking hostages—is terrorism, a radical separatist would respond, so be 
it. It matters not, the logic continued, whether those active in the revolution-
ary struggle for national liberation are labeled terrorists or the violence they 
employ to pave the way to independence are “acts of terror.” The Croatian 
separatist movement was imagined as one without compromise. Both mor-
ally and discursively, this meant a potential embrace of any and all forms of 
violence, including terrorism, in order to further the cause. And embrace 
violence they did.
This book’s second conceptual concern is its engagement with “history.” 
Some of the most prolific and productive areas of academic inquiry in the 
humanities and social sciences in recent years have concerned the politics of 
social memory and remembrance. Scholarship contending with the history of 
socialist Yugoslavia and in particular its collapse into warfare in the 1990s 
has been at the forefront of this research, both benefiting from and contrib-
uting to theoretical and conceptual advances in how academics understand 
the construction of social memory and its political mobilization. 42 The field 
of terrorism studies shares these concerns, particularly research dealing with 
ethno-national terrorism. Indeed, the creation and maintenance of national 
myths are absolutely central to national liberation movements in serving to 
rally support for the cause, justify the struggle, and legitimize the use of vi-
olence. Of course, such narratives are not presented and treated as myths but 
rather as “factual histories” that are both proven and incontestable. Broadly, 
these “histories” serve two purposes. On the one hand, they keep alive a 
memory of the former glory and greatness of the national group in question, 
often with a reference to past examples of independence. On the other hand, 
they nourish a sense of deprivation, marginalization, and even existential 
threat by propagating the litany of affronts, injuries, and crimes committed 
against the nation, both in the past and often in the present day. 43 The resultant 
victim complex then becomes a powerful and compelling force to mobilize 
populations to action.
The Croatian radical separatist movement not only follows this pattern, 
but in many ways it serves as a textbook example of how history and mem-
ory are instrumentalized to promote a particular political agenda. As will be 
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seen throughout this book, radical Croatian separatists justified their actions 
through what generously could only be called highly contentious historical 
claims. Importantly, this book does not contend historiographically with the 
myths and interpretations of the past promulgated by extremist Croats in the 
emigration. As mentioned previously, there is already a large and growing 
body of literature dealing with the uses and abuses of history and memory 
among Croats, both in the past and today. Rather, this book focuses on the 
instrumentalization of particular histories and memories, first to help radical-
ize the separatist movement and later to legitimize the movement’s embrace 
of terrorism. This distinction should not be confused with an acceptance or 
validation of the “histories” examined within the text. The point is rather to lay 
bare how Cold War–era Croatian separatists discursively framed their strug-
gle. The claims made by separatist radicals, for instance, that Tito’s socialist 
Yugoslavia was engaging in genocidal practices against the Croatian nation 
or that the Bleiburg massacre was a tragedy that far exceeded the crimes of 
the NDH makes neither true. However, the separatists’ belief in their truth is 
crucial to understanding their radicalization and turn to terrorism. 
A third concern central to the book’s narrative is the terminology that 
refers to different groups of actors within the Croatian separatist movement. 
Broadly speaking, the limited literature on Croatian political violence after 
World War II describes acts of terror as the work of “émigrés.” 44 This book 
argues that this label obscures as much as it reveals about the origins, de-
velopment, and nature of Croatian separatist violence during the Cold War. 
Those who might be considered true “émigrés”—meaning the generation that 
left Yugoslavia in the immediate aftermath of the war for reasons that can 
be described primarily if not wholly as political—were not the ones actively 
engaged in the separatist violence of the 1960s and 1970s. Rather, as already 
mentioned—and will be explored at length—Croatian separatist violence and 
terrorism during this period arose out of a direct opposition to the “émigré” 
generation, not from that “émigré” generation itself.
With no significant exceptions, the perpetrators of Cold War–era sep-
aratist violence belonged to what this book refers to as a generation of 
“semi-émigrés.” In contrast to Croats who left for the West immediately fol-
lowing the end of World War II, the generation that left socialist Yugoslavia 
beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s did so largely more for economic 
than political reasons. Nonetheless, to characterize this generation simply as 
“economic migrants” ignores the complex motivations and forces that led so 
many Croats to leave their homes. In the experience of most of this second 
generation of postwar emigrants, the line between “economic” and “political” 
migration was blurred. The label “semi-émigré” is meant to conceptualize 
this dual reality. If “émigré” has the connotation of political self-exile, then 
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“semi-émigré” suggests the shared role played by economics and politics in 
the story of the second generation of post–World War II Croatian emigrants. 
Stated more directly, “semi” is not a reference to the space the younger gen-
eration occupied (i.e., half in the emigration and half at home) but rather to 
the motivating factors that led the majority of the generation’s members to 
go abroad in the first place (i.e., half political and half economic). Even more 
simply, and without intending to reify the two primary groups of Croatian 
emigrants at the heart of this book’s narrative, the distinction between the 
terms “émigré” and “semi-émigré” is meant to distinguish those who left 
Croatia directly after World War II from those who made their way to the 
West a generation later.
The drawing of this distinction between these two generations of emi-
grants provides a framework for dealing with a fourth issue related to Cold 
War–era political violence and terrorism—namely, the legacy of the Ustaše. 
Both contemporary and contemporaneous accounts of postwar Croatian sep-
aratist terrorism place blame for the violence on the “Ustaše.” The majority of 
these accounts have a clear normative objective for labeling Croatian violence 
as such. This was particularly true for the Yugoslav government, whose own 
political legitimacy relied on keeping a real or imagined Ustaša threat to the 
regime alive. The reality of Cold War–era Croatian radical separatism, how-
ever, both complicates and problematizes such reductionist claims. To be sure, 
the Ustaše served as a crucial foundation for Croatian separatism throughout 
the Cold War, and Ustašism was deeply embedded in the DNA of the national 
liberation movement. In particular, the semi-émigré generation of separatists 
emulated the extreme national chauvinism of the interwar and wartime Ustaše, 
expressing contemptuous and often genocidal views toward the Serbs.
This said, the radical postwar separatist movement originated, developed, 
and operated in a context meaningfully different from that of the prewar, war-
time, and even postwar Ustaše, leading to significant distinctions between the 
two. As will be explored later, these differences were especially pronounced 
in the highly elastic ideological pragmatism and political opportunism of 
radical separatists in the 1960s and 1970s. If the defining characteristics of 
Ustašism were, as Mark Biondich has written, “anti-Serbianism, anticommu-
nism, and its cult of Croatian statehood,” 45 the postwar separatists reduced 
their message to anti-Serbianism and the cult of Croatian statehood. It was 
not, of course, that communism somehow became the preferred ideology of 
radical separatists following World War II. Rather, statehood trumped political 
philosophy, meaning that separatists were willing to align with supporters 
of any ideology—including communists—who could potentially help in the 
destruction of Tito’s hated Yugoslav state. As the title page of every edi-
tion of Drina, one of the leading separatist newspapers of the Cold War era, 
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declared matter-of-factly: “Our position is clear: Overthrow every Yugoslavia. 
Overthrow it together with Russians and Americans, with communists, with 
non-communists, and with anticommunists. Overthrow it together with any-
one who is trying to overthrow it. Overthrow it by means of verbal dialectic 
and dynamite, but overthrow it, for if there is one country without the right to 
exist, that can only be Yugoslavia.” 46 This is not to suggest, of course, that the 
very real fascist leanings of Cold War–era anti-Yugoslav Croatian separatists 
should be ignored or even downplayed. Indeed, the “anti-ideological” political 
realism of radical Croats arose from an excess rather than a deficiency of na-
tionalism within the movement. But it was a nationalism even less burdened 
by ideological concerns than that of the already ideologically incoherent and 
self-contradictory Ustaše. 47
An imperfect analogy can be found in the relationship between Nazism 
and neo-Nazism. Just as neo-Nazis cannot be understood in isolation from 
the Nazis under Hitler, Cold War–era radical Croatian separatism cannot be 
understood without regard to the prewar and wartime Ustaša movement. 48 
Many if not most of the symbols, ideas, and aims adopted by postwar rad-
ical Croats were either taken from or directly referenced the Ustaše. But as 
with Nazism and neo-Nazism, the social contexts and historical conditions 
that underlaid the development of semi-émigré Croatian separatism in the 
1960s and 1970s mean that an understanding of the origins, development, and 
character of the Ustaše can give only a partial picture of these postwar radi-
cals. Circumstances do not just matter but are formative, and as such there is 
value in exploring movements such as neo-Nazism and semi-émigré Croatian 
separatism as phenomena unto themselves. Without making any relativistic 
comparisons between certain movements and their “neo” offspring, discussion 
of sociological and historiographic differences between, say, Ustašism and 
postwar radical separatism is meant only to productively complicate how we 
think of social movements of all kinds.
The difficulty in comparing neo-Nazis and radical semi-émigré Croats 
is the degree to which—as discussed earlier—postwar Croatian separatism 
was arguably as much an “oppositional” as a “neo” movement. Here again, the 
details of history are important. Far more than was the case with the Nazis, the 
Ustaše maintained a high level of continuity in the decades following World 
War II. As this book explores at length, intense disappointment in and disillu-
sionment with those Ustaše who continued their political activity well into the 
Cold War was a central contributor to the adoption of terrorism and political 
violence in the struggle for Croatian independence beginning in the 1960s. 
Many members of the semi-émigré generation rejected émigré Ustaša lead-
ers, including the movement’s poglavnik—or führer—Ante Pavelić. Indeed, 
radical separatism developed in a very meaningful way out of a conscious and 
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deliberate desire by a new generation of semi-émigrés to create an alternative 
to the Ustaše—or at least to what the Ustaše had become. Consequently, to 
reduce postwar radical separatism to simply Ustašism or even neo-Ustašism 
obfuscates an important and even formative feature of the movement.
Historical Background
This said, whatever the differences between the prewar and wartime Ustaše 
and postwar separatist movements, much more connects than separates the 
two. Understanding the origins, evolution, and activities of Cold War–era 
radical separatism requires knowledge of how far-right Croatian nationalism 
developed from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of World War II.
In the succinct words of Mark Biondich, “the most significant factor shap-
ing modern Croatian nationalist ideology has been the concept of historical 
rights.” 49 Developed in the nineteenth century most prominently by the pol-
itician, publicist, and writer Ante Starčević, this notion holds that because 
the medieval Croatian kingdom had never been truly abolished, independent 
statehood was a historical right owed to the people of Croatia, above and be-
yond the natural right to statehood ostensibly enjoyed by all nations. Although 
first incorporated into Hungary in 1102 and then into the Habsburg Empire 
in 1527—or so the thinking went—the legal continuity of Croatian political 
structures such as the diet (Sabor) and office of the viceroy (Ban) as well as 
the maintenance of the Croatian political nation as incorporated in the nobility 
meant that Croatia had never completely lost its autonomy. 50 As argued by 
adherents of state rights, Croatian statehood was a fact, not just an aspiration. 
That foreign hegemonic actors—notably Budapest and Vienna—denied and 
violated this “fact” did not undermine the essence of the Croatian state.
The establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes after 
World War I did not destroy the convictions of radical adherents to the idea 
of historical Croatian state rights. For many hard-line Croatian nationalists, 
“Yugoslavism”—whose advocates called at a minimum for the political union 
and at a maximum the ethnic assimilation of all South Slavic peoples into a 
single state—meant little more than the shift in domination over the Croatian 
nation from the Austrians and Hungarians to the Serbs. The most radical 
opposition to the new government in Belgrade came from the Croatian Party 
of Rights (HSP; Hrvatska stranka prava), which was a direct descendent of 
the Party of Rights (SP; Stranka prava) founded by Starčević, together with 
Eugen Kvaternik in 1861. The HSP advocated a position of exclusionary na-
tionalism that not only rejected the idea of political cooperation among Croats 
and other national groups but viewed cooperation as intrinsically harmful to 
the Croatian nation. 51 Indeed, the party’s program viewed any activity whose 
ultimate aim was not the abolishment of Serbian hegemony over Croatia as 
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anathema. In the words of one party leader, the entire raison d’être of the HSP 
was to stand as “the bearer of an uncompromising and revolutionary struggle 
[against Belgrade].” 52
During much of the first decade of royalist Yugoslavia’s existence, there 
was little to suggest that such views were more than empty rhetoric. This 
changed rather dramatically following King Aleksandar’s establishment of 
a royal dictatorship on January 6, 1929, in the aftermath of the assassination 
of Stjepan Radić, the charismatic leader of Croatia’s most popular political 
party, the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS; Hrvatska seljačka stranka). 53 With all 
national political parties disbanded and fearful that the regime would begin 
persecuting Croatian nationalists and political hard-liners, many members of 
the HSP fled the country, primarily to Benito Mussolini’s fascist Italy. In exile, 
the most militant Croat dissidents coalesced around the HSP's former party 
secretary, Ante Pavelić. A rising star of the HSP, this young lawyer set out to 
recruit a dedicated cadre of radical nationalists willing to engage in a violent 
struggle for the liberation of Croatia from the fetters of Serbian control. In 
1932, this movement was formalized as the Ustaša—Croatian Revolutionary 
Organization (Ustaša; Hrvatska revolucionarna organizacija), with Pavelić as 
poglavnik, or leader. 54
It could be argued that Croatian nationalists only truly radicalized in 
exile, in large part due to engagement with new and formative transnational 
spaces, practices, and structures. Shortly after escaping to Italy, Pavelić estab-
lished relations with two groups who put violence at the core of their political 
programs. The first was the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization 
(VMRO; Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija), with whom 
Pavelić signed a declaration of agreement to engage in a common struggle to 
bring about the destruction of both the Yugoslav state and Serbian hegemony 
over the Croatian and Macedonian nations. The second was Mussolini’s fascist 
party. Mussolini had long held Belgrade to be at least partially responsible for 
Italy’s so-called mutilated victory after World War I, and many of Il Duce’s im-
perialistic pretentions during the interwar period focused on lands contained 
within royalist Yugoslavia. Invested in the destabilization of the Southern 
Slav state, Mussolini was more than happy to provide support for enemies of 
the Belgrade regime.
With inspiration and encouragement from the VMRO and Italian Fascists, 
the Ustaše came to fully embrace political violence and terrorism as “act” 
rather than simply “idea.” The Ustaše established two military-style camps to 
train its members in the tactics and methods of terrorism and guerilla warfare, 
one in the northern Italian town of Bovegno and the other on a Hungarian 
estate called Janka Puszta, located three kilometers from the border with 
Yugoslavia. From 1929 to 1934, the Ustaše engaged in a campaign of terror, 
  Introduction 21
sabotage, and political murder in royalist Yugoslavia that included assassina-
tions and assassination attempts as well as bomb attacks on police stations, 
governmental buildings, and trains. The Ustaše also planned and executed an 
incursion into the Velebit region of Croatia in hopes of instigating a popular 
uprising against the state. 55 The revolt never materialized, but the incursion 
nevertheless rattled authorities in Belgrade. In response, the royalist Yugoslav 
government moved to suppress revolutionary tendencies among the country’s 
population, instituting a number of stringent security measures.
The most notorious act of violence committed by the Ustaše prior to World 
War II was the assassination of Yugoslavia’s head of state, King Aleksandar. 
On the afternoon of October 9, 1934, Aleksandar was shot and killed as his 
motorcade made its way through the French port city of Marseilles at the 
start of an official state visit to France. The bullets were fired by a Bulgarian 
member of the VMRO named Vlado Chernozemski, but the assassination 
had been planned and prepared by the Ustaše. The strategic thinking behind 
the regicide was that the monarch’s death would rob royalist Yugoslavia of its 
great “unifier”—as Aleksandar’s supporters referred to him—subverting the 
state and paving the way for Croatian independence.
As is often the case with such acts of political violence, expectations 
did not match reality. Within Croatia itself, the regicide was broadly con-
demned, with the populace reacting not with revolutionary fervor but with 
disquiet, misgiving, and even genuine sorrow. 56 Internationally, the fallout 
from the assassination forced Mussolini to neutralize the Ustaše, as the or-
ganization had become more a liability than an asset. The architects of the 
attentat against Aleksandar—Ante Pavelić and Eugen Dido Kvaternik—were 
arrested and imprisoned for two years. The remaining Ustaše were sent into 
internal exile on the Sicilian island of Lipari. Three years after the assassina-
tion, in 1937, Mussolini even signed an agreement of friendship with royalist 
Yugoslavia that included a complete ban of the Ustaše in Italy. The murder of 
King Aleksandar, which was meant to bring about the destruction of royalist 
Yugoslavia, actually did more damage to the Ustaše themselves. Broken and 
disjointed, the movement spent the remainder of the 1930s forced to strug-
gle not for national liberation but simply for some modicum of cohesion and 
relevance.
An argument could be made that the Ustaše would simply have fallen 
into obscurity—the assassination of King Aleksandar notwithstanding—and 
even oblivion, had it not been for World War II. The Axis invasion, defeat, and 
partition of royalist Yugoslavia in April 1941 not only gave new impetus to the 
movement but thrust the Ustaše into a position of significant power. Pavelić 
was not Hitler’s first choice to assume leadership of the newly established 
Independent State of Croatia; HSS head Vladko Maček famously twice was 
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offered and declined the position. But when given the opportunity, Pavelić em-
braced the office with a fervor perhaps unmatched in Nazi-occupied Europe. 
If the ideological underpinnings of Ustašism remained largely underdeveloped 
and rudimentary prior to the war, its principles became totally clear under the 
new regime. 57 Greatly indebted to the Italian Fascists and, in particular, the 
German National Socialists, Pavelić and the Ustaše coupled integral national-
ism with a cult of violence that was fiercely hostile to communism, capitalism, 
and liberal democracy once in power. Moreover, they held the view that the 
unity of the Croatian nation—which they understood as an organic entity—
could be preserved only through the destruction of all threats to the nation, 
both internal and external.
To this end, the Ustaše implemented a program of ethnic genocide that 
rivaled any in wartime Europe. State and military authorities brutally per-
secuted Serbs, Jews, Roma, and Croatian antifascists within the NDH, with 
Serbs singled out for especially harsh violence. The Ustaša militia was given 
free rein to terrorize minority populations throughout the NDH, and in the 
village of Jasenovac, some 100 kilometers from Zagreb, the Ustaše estab-
lished a network of concentration camps with the aim of eradicating those 
populations. By war’s end, the Ustaše had murdered a minimum of 50,000 
people in Jasenovac, with the number likely close to twice that amount. 58 
In total, the Ustaše killed upward of 350,000 Serbs between 1941 and 1945, 
themselves killed or deported to Nazi extermination camps 32,000 of the 
40,000 Jews living in the NDH, and eradicated nearly all of the state’s 25,000 
Roma. Of the more than one million people who lost their lives in Yugoslavia 
during World War II, 60 percent died in the NDH. This toll places the country 
third behind only the Soviet Union and Poland for total casualties in Nazi-
occupied Europe. 59
The Allied victory over the Axis Powers in 1945—which includes the 
defeat of both the Nazis and Ustaše by the Partisan forces of Marshal Tito—
brought an end to the Independent State of Croatia. Not entirely unjustifiably, 
many Croats—soldiers and civilians alike—feared that capture by advancing 
Partisans in the last days of the war would subject them to retributive violence 
for Ustaša crimes. Tens of thousands of Croats attempted to flee the territory 
that comprised the NDH at the end of the war in the hope they might surrender 
to British forces in occupied Austria and avoid capture by the communists. It 
was not to be. They reached the Austrian border near the town of Bleiburg, 
only to have the British deny their request to surrender. Worse, the British 
proceeded to hand the refugees over to Tito’s forces, who executed several 
thousand on the spot. Many more died over the course of the next several days 
and weeks during an eight-hundred-kilometer-long “death march” back into 
Partisan-controlled Yugoslavia. As with almost all estimates regarding mass 
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violence in Yugoslavia during World War II, the question of how many died 
at Bleiburg and during the so-called Way of the Cross (Križni put) is highly 
contentious. Recent estimates suggest that of the two hundred thousand peo-
ple who reached Austria in May 1945, some seventy thousand were killed, of 
whom fifty thousand were Croats. 60 As will be further explored later, Bleiburg 
became the cornerstone of a powerful victim complex that permeated postwar 
Croatian identity discourse, particularly in the emigration.
While most Ustaše sought through emigration to escape the new reality 
of a reconstituted, communist-led Yugoslav state, at least some continued 
the struggle for an independent Croatia. For several years after the official 
end of World War II, guerilla units of Ustaša soldiers known as Crusaders 
(Križari) waged a sustained, if limited and poorly organized, armed resistance 
against Tito’s fledgling communist authority in Yugoslavia. 61 Among other 
acts of violence, the Križari sabotaged communications and rail lines, 
targeted public and governmental officials for assassination, attacked police 
and army installations, and even destroyed collective farms. Alive to the 
risk that the insurgency posed, the Yugoslav security services implemented 
a counterinsurgency campaign called Operacija Gvardijan (Operation 
Guardian), which involved first and foremost the infiltration of the Križari. 
The culmination of Gvardijan came in the summer of 1948 when the Križari 
launched their largest operation of the postwar era, codenamed Akcija 10. 
travnja (Tenth of April Action) in reference to the date of the NDH’s founding. 
Fully informed of the details of this effort, the Yugoslav security services were 
able to entrap eighteen separate groups of Križari militants, totaling ninety-six 
men, including the leader of the operation Božidar “Božo” Kavran. Although 
small groups of Križari would occasionally appear even into the 1950s, 
Gvardijan and the subsequent trials of captured Križari extinguished once 
and for all any pretense of a significant Ustaša presence in postwar Yugoslavia. 
It was equally clear that, as before the war, the struggle for Croatian national 
liberation was a battle that would have to be waged from exile.
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